Abstract-The emergence of social and technological networks has enabled rapid sharing of data and information. This has resulted in significant privacy concerns, where private information can be either leaked or inferred from public data. The problem is significantly harder for social networks, where we may reveal more information to our friends than to strangers. Nonetheless, our private information can still leak to strangers as our friends are their friends and so on. In order to address this important challenge, in this paper, we present a privacy-preserving mechanism that enables private data to be diffused over a network. In particular, whenever a user wants to access another users' data, the proposed mechanism returns a differentially private response that ensures that the amount of private data leaked depends on the distance between the two users in the network. While allowing global statistics to be inferred by users acting as analysts, our mechanism guarantees that no individual user, or a group of users, can harm the privacy guarantees of any other user. We illustrate our mechanism with two examples: one on synthetic data where the users share their global positioning system coordinates, and the other on a Facebook ego network where a user shares her infection status.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N THE era of social networks, individuals' profiles include an increasing amount of private information such as their age, location, and shopping habits. Besides users' intention to share this information for social interaction, their private data enable systems such as location-based services and collaborative recommender engines, that is, systems that are not part of their friendship network. Therefore, although users consent to share their private data with their friends, when this is not the case, severe privacy concerns are raised.
Traditionally, these privacy concerns are mitigated by restricting access rights (e.g., on Facebook); more precisely, only users indicated as friends are granted access to each user's personal information. However, such an approach has severe limitations as follows: first, this scheme is inflexible since users cannot be partitioned into exactly two groups, that is, friends and strangers. Instead, privacy concerns gradually increase from family members and friends to acquaintances and, finally, strangers. Second, a scheme based on access rights keeps private information local, which limits the ability of inferring statistics of the entire network. For instance, consider users acting as network analysts who are interested in statistics over the whole population of the social network such as population density maps and epidemic monitoring. This limits the utility of the network. Hence, an alternative mechanism that allows global statistics on the whole population and respecting individuals' privacy is needed. For example, when individuals share their shopping habits, they contribute to the social welfare by allowing for more efficient recommender systems. Frameworks for providing privacy guarantees are differential privacy [1] and information-theoretic privacy [2] . However, most of the previous approaches in both frameworks do not consider variable privacy levels in a network, where the level of privacy depends on friendship distance. Hereafter, we consider a network where users wish to share their private data under privacy guarantees, where the strength of these guarantees is quantified by the distance on the graph. Within the context of a social network, users wish to communicate accurate information with little privacy guarantees to their close friends, whereas they desire strong privacy guarantees whenever their private data are communicated to distant areas of the network. From the point of view of a user acting as a network analyst, statistics over the whole network need to be possible while ensuring privacy guarantees. In the model proposed here, we assume a trusted network operator and, thus, we do not provide privacy guarantees of the users against the operator. Instead, we protect the users' privacy from all other users of the network. In addition, our work targets networks, in general, that may lack a single network operator. In that case, users have different trust levels against different users and, therefore, wish to share their private data with different privacy guarantees. In that case, the trust levels can either be hand-picked by the users or can be inferred from the network structure. For the scope of this work, we assume that these trust levels are given.
Multiple privacy-preserving frameworks that formalize privacy guarantees have appeared in the literature, for example, [2] and [3] . Commonly, privacy-preserving approaches add artificial noise to the accessed private data. This noise is designed such that the resulting response conveys little information about the private data. Specifically, an information-theoretic approach [2] constrains the mutual information between the private data and the released signal. Similarly, differential privacy [1] , [3] requires that the statistics of the noisy response should be almost independent of perturbations of the private data. In this work, we adopt the framework of differential privacy because of its strong privacy guarantees, yet the underlying problem can be formulated under other privacy frameworks.
Within differential privacy, an extensive family of privacypreserving mechanisms has emerged. The application range of these mechanisms varies from solving linear problems [4] , [5] , distributed convex optimization [6] , Kalman filtering [7] , and consensus that protects the network topology [8] to smart metering [9] , [10] and traffic flow estimation [11] . In particular, the problems introduced in the aforementioned line of research share a common underlying abstract problem that can be stated as follows: given the private data and a predefined privacy requirement, we need to design a differentially private algorithm, called mechanism, which accurately approximates a desired quantity. Then, a single sample from the mechanism is published and is used as a proxy for the exact response, so a curious user cannot confidently infer the original private data. Instead of considering a single privacy level and assuming that the responses are publicly released, that is, everyone receives the same response, in this paper, we consider the novel problem of assigning different privacy levels for different users. Moreover, contrary to publishing the responses, we assume that they are securely communicated to each user. Therefore, the aforementioned works do not address the problem introduced here. Furthermore, in [12] and [13] , multicomponent private data and different privacy levels for different components are considered, that is, in a user's profile, typically, stronger privacy is required for the component representing salary compared to that of age. Contrary to previous works that focus on variable privacy for different components of one's data, our paper focuses on different privacy levels that depend on friendship status. The work closest to ours is [14] , where the problem of relaxing the privacy level after, for example, supplementary payments to the owners of the sensitive data was considered. Although some of the tools in [14] are leveraged to provide a solution, here, we consider a different problem, which is the problem of releasing sensitive data to multiple parties with different privacy levels and has not been studied before.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II informally describes the problem of diffusing private data across a network, then, provides a model of the system, reviews differential privacy, and derives a formal statement of the problem. Section III introduces a composite mechanism based on a Markov stochastic process and presents low-complexity algorithmic implementations of this mechanism. We demonstrate our approach with two illustrative examples in Section IV: one on synthetic network where a user releases her global positioning system (GPS) coordinates and one on a Facebook ego network where a user shares her infection status.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here, the problem of releasing private information over networks (i.e., social networks) is formulated. First, we provide an informal description of the problem whose formal statements are presented in Problems 1 and 2 in the end of this section. Let a network be represented as a graph G = (V, E), where each node i ∈ V is a user and each edge (i, j) ∈ E represents a friendship relation between users i and j. Also, we assume that each user i owns a private data u i ∈ U, where U is the set of possible private data, and wishes to share their private data with the rest of the users under privacy guarantees. Specifically, user i generates an approximation y ij of u i and securely communicates y ij to user j. More specifically, each user i requires her data u i to be (d ij )-differential privacy against user j (differential privacy is overviewed in Section II-B In order to formalize these statements as in Problem 1 and, eventually, in Problem 2, we need to revisit some concepts and known results. Subsequently, modeling assumptions are presented in Section II-A, whereas differential privacy is briefly reviewed in Section II-B. We present a conventional approach, that is, a scheme based on access rights in Section II-C, whereas Section II-D formally presents the problem of diffusing private data over networks.
A. System Model
Consider a network represented as a graph G with |V| = N nodes. For simplicity, we assume that the graph is undirected and unweighted, although this assumption can be removed. Each node i ∈ V represents a user and (i, j) ∈ E ⊆ V × V represents the friendship relation between users i and j. Each user owns a private data u i ∈ U. Typical examples of private data include the following. [16] . Distance functions that are more suitable for social networks have been proposed in the literature; for example, see [17, Fig. 2] . In this paper, we assume that these distances are given and we focus on preserving the privacy of the users' data. Moreover, distances d ij may not depend only on the structure of the underlying network but also on the attributes of the nodes. For instance, a family relationship between users i and j may lead to a smaller value of d ij . Furthermore, directed edges (e.g., blocked users) can also be allowed in social network scenarios.
Additionally, we assume the existence of a trusted central authority. Users provide their noiseless private data to this authority-already the case with modern social networkswhich executes a privacy-preserving mechanism, adds noise, and securely communicates the responses to each user. Then, differential privacy protects user's i private data from inference attacks by an adversarial user j while honest users locally run any postprocessing such as a recommendation system. The assumption of a central authority can be relaxed by considering honest but curious users with only local secure communications.
B. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal framework that provides rigorous privacy guarantees. Differentially private algorithms add noise in order to make it hard for a curious user to infer whether someone's data has been used in the computation. The dependence of this noisy response on the private data is required to be bounded, as formally stated in Definition 1. The strength of this bound is quantified by the nonnegative parameter ∈ [0, ∞), called privacy level, where smaller values of imply stronger privacy guarantees. Moreover, an adjacency relation A is a symmetric binary relation over the set of private data U, which includes the pairs of private data (u, u ) that should be rendered almost indistinguishable. Furthermore, a mechanism 1 Q : U → Δ (Y) is a randomized map from the space of private data to the space of responses.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy [1] ): Let > 0, U be the space of private data, and A ⊆ U × U be an adjacency relation. The mechanism Q : U → Δ (Y) is -differentially private if
In this paper, we consider real-valued private data U = R n and the following adjacency relation:
where α ∈ R + is a small constant. Practically, adjacency relation A 2 requires that, given the output of mechanism Q, a curious user should not be able to infer the private input u within a radius of α. A popular differentially private mechanism is the Laplace mechanism, which is near optimal [10] , [18] , is used as a building block for many mechanisms, and is described next. Theorem 2 (Laplace mechanism [1] ): Consider the mechanism Q : R n → Δ (R n ) that adds Laplace distributed noise:
b . Then, mechanism Q is -differential private under adjacency relation A 2 .
1 For a set T and a rich-enough σ-algebra T on it, we denote the set of all probability measures on (T , T ) with Δ(T ). Specifically, for Euclidean spaces T = R n , we consider the Borel's σ-algebra. Under an access right scheme (a), only friends of the starred user (white nodes) are granted access to the exact information, whereas any other member (black nodes) have no access. Such a scheme partitions users to only two groups: friends and strangers. Moreover, each user has access only to local information and cannot estimate the global state of the network. Therefore, any estimator constructed by the diamond user will be independent of the data of the starred user and, thus, biased. On the other hand, (b) proposes an approach where users' privacy concerns scale with the distance from others. Friends (lighter-colored nodes) receive a less noisy version of the private data, whereas strangers (darkercolored nodes) receive only heavily perturbed versions. Despite the increased noise, estimates of aggregate statistics are possible. However, coalitions might be encouraged and initial privacy guarantees can quickly degrade. For example, users within the circle can combine their estimates and infer the private data of the starred user. (a) Access right scheme. (b) Distance-based scheme.
C. Access Rights Scheme
Now, we describe a typical approach for handling privacy concerns in social network while highlighting its limitations and motivating the need for a more sophisticated privacy-aware approach. Fig. 1(a) shows a synthetic network with 150 nodes, where the starred node wishes to share her sensitive information with the rest of the network. Privacy concerns can be handled by regulating access privileges. For example, friends of a user can access her data, whereas every other user cannot. Such a scheme has limitations. On one hand, users are coarsely partitioned to friends and strangers as depicted in Fig. 1(a) ; friends of the starlabeled user are colored white, whereas strangers are colored black. Instead, the distance between two users can be more finely quantified by a real-valued function. On the other hand, each user has access only to neighboring information. Although restricting access rights settles privacy concerns, computing global statistics on the network is impossible, limiting the utility of the network. Indeed, any estimator of global quantities (mean value, histogram, etc.) will be biased. Therefore, users may choose to collaborate, merge their local information, and damage any privacy guarantees. 
D. Diffusing Sensitive Information Over a Social Network
Under the modeling introduced in Section II-A, we pose the problem of designing a mechanism that diffuses private data over a network in the following.
Problem 1: Design a privacy-aware mechanism Q : U → Δ U N that privately releases user's i sensitive data u i ∈ U over a social network. Specifically, design mechanism Q that generates N responses {y j } N j =1 , where y ij is the securely communicated response to user j. Furthermore, for the adjacency relation (1) (where, for simplicity, α = 1), the mechanism Q needs to satisfy the following properties:
1) Variable privacy: The mechanism must generate the response y ij for private data u i , which is (d ij )-differential private. 2) Optimal utility: Response y ij must be an accurate approximation of the sensitive data u i , that is, for real-valued private data, it should minimize the expected squared-error
Although the utility part of the problem is stated in a multiobjective sense, it can be stated in a single objective
Specifically, whenever individual i shares her sensitive information to another individual j, she requires (d ij )-differential privacy, where (·) : R + → R + is a decreasing function that converts a distance d to a privacy level (d). People residing close (w.r.t. a distance) to individual i receive a loose privacy constraint ij 1, whereas strangers get noisier versions ij 1. Problem 1 admits a straightforward but unsatisfying approach. Let
−1 , independently for each user j ∈ V. Subsequently, a group of users j ∈ A ⊆ U have the incentive to collaborate share their estimates {y ij } j ∈A in order to derive a more accurate estimator y A of u i described by mation of the sensitive data u i . Here, the performance of the mechanism is captured by the need that each response y ij approximated private data u i as accurately as possible. Specifically, response y ij is not a noiseless copy of data u i because of the need for 1) ij -privacy of user i against user j and 2) guarding against coalitions due to the existence of multiple users. The first limitation stems from the privacy-utility tradeoff, whereas, for the second, we will prove that the existence of multiple users apart from i and j does not incur any further performance loss.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we approach the problem of diffusing private data over a network. Section III-A derives the needed theoretical results and establishes that the accuracy of each estimate y ij depends only on the distance d ij . Moreover, algorithmic implementations of the composite mechanism Q should scale for vast social networks. Section III-B provides algorithmic implementations of the mechanism Q with complexity O ln
.
A. Private Stochastic Process
For n-dimensional real-valued private data u ∈ R n , we derive a composite mechanism that generates the response y ij that user j receives as an approximation of user's i private data u i . This mechanism has the following two properties. First, the accuracy of the response y ij depends solely on the distance d ij between nodes i and j. Specifically, the expected squared error E y ij − u i 2 2 does not depend on any other parameters of the network (e.g., size, topology) or the rest of the responses {y ik } k ∈V\{j } . Second, any group of users A ⊆ V that decides to collaborate and share their responses {y ij } j ∈A cannot infer anything more about user's i private data. Algorithmic aspects of the composite mechanism are deferred until Section III-B.
Definition 3 introduces a continuous-domain stochastic process {V } > 0 , which is used in Theorem 4 to define a composite privacy-preserving mechanism. Properties, sampling algorithms, and the derivation of it are deferred for later.
Definition 3: Define the stochastic process {V } > 0 with the following properties.
2) The process is Markov, that is, for any 0 3) For any 0
where K is the modified Bessel function of the second kind. Theorem 4: Let d ij ∈ R + denote the distance between users i and j, and u i ∈ R be the private data of user i. Consider the mechanism Q that generates the responses:
where {V (i) } > 0 is a sample of a Markov stochastic process {V } > 0 . Then, mechanism Q provides a solution to Problem 2. In particular, it has the following properties.
1) The variance of response y ij is n (n + 1) (d ij ) −2 and, thus, depends only on the distance between users i and j. For n = 1, the stochastic process {V } has closed-form expressions, whereas, for n > 1, closed-form expressions are derived only for the infinitesimal increments V +d − V . Nonetheless, we derive handles that allow for exact (in the sense that we do not use approximations of the process) and efficient (in the algorithmic complexity sense) sampling of the process. Furthermore, our proof techniques are robust and can possibly be applied beyond the Laplace mechanism; for example, the Knorm mechanism [19] that appears in a different setting than the one considered here. 2 -norm of two samples of the stochastic process {V } > 0 in high dimensions (n = 20), which can be used to diffuse private signals over networks, such as power consumption in smart grids. Fig. 2 pictures two samples of the stochastic process {V } > 0 , for n = 2, in polar coordinates and shows that the process is a jump process, that is, with high probability, the process is constant in small intervals. Fig. 3 pictures two samples of the process in high dimensions. The process is again lazy; yet, the jumps are more often.
A major consequence of Theorem 4 is that mechanism Q does not incentivize coalitions. Specifically, consider a group of curious users A ⊆ V who wish to estimate u i more accurately and, thus, collaborate and share their knowledge {y ij } j ∈A . In practice, such a group can be fake accounts of a single but distant (in the sense of d) user. Then, given this shared knowledge, the best estimator isû
Therefore, user j * is not benefited by such a coalition, and thus, she has no incentive to participate in the coalition and share her information y ij * . In fact, Theorem 4 solves Problem 2 in the best possible way: the existence of multiple users asking for the same private data under different privacy levels does not require additional privacy-preserving noise.
B. Algorithmic Implementation
Sampling from a continuous-domain stochastic process can often be performed only approximately. For example, consider the Brownian motion {B t } t∈ [0, 1] , which, for sampling purposes, requires storing an infimum of real values. Contrary to Brownian motion, the private process {V } > 0 rarely changes value and is, thus, lazy. More formally, restricted to a sufficiently small interval [ 1 , 2 ], the stochastic process {V } ∈[ 1 , 2 ] is constant with high probability. Furthermore, assuming the existence of an algorithm for computing the distance d ij , the response y ij can be generated during runtime. This property is crucial, since it circumvents the O N 2 memory requirements of a static implementation. Proposition 5 characterizes the distribution of the number of jumps in a bounded interval. ) and exactly (in the sense that we are not discretizing the interval or approximating the processes).
Require: Dimension n; Privacy levels 1 and 2 , such that
end function This laziness renders samples from the process highly compressible. Indeed, given the locations 
Algorithm 1 draws a sample of the stochastic process by sampling V 2 . Next, the algorithm proceeds toward smaller values 2 We use the notation V − = lim τ ↑ V τ and V + = lim τ ↓ V τ . 
Sampling from these distributions can be performed using a uniform random variable and the quantile function.
of the privacy level by sampling the dormant time and the size of the jump. Specifically, the algorithm initializes a trace of the process by sampling from the Laplace mechanism. This is done in two steps: using the Gaussian distribution, the direction is drawn uniformly from the n − 1-sphere, and then, the magnitude is drawn from the Gamma distribution. Then, the algorithm extends this trace backwards in by sampling for the location of the next jump. The logarithm of the positions where jumps occur define a Poisson process with rate λ = n + 1, and thus, the length δ = ln Typical single-dimensional (n = 1) private data are date of birth, salary, and health status. For n = 2, our results are applicable to geoindistinguishability [20] which is differential privacy for GPS locations and is experimentally illustrated in Section IV-A. Finally, the case n → ∞ appeals to private signals that appear in filtering problems and smart grid applications.
For completeness, Table I presents the parameterization of the elementary distributions used by the proposed algorithms. We note that the Bessel distribution decays exponentially and has closed-form expressions for odd n. Nonetheless, it is a singledimensional distribution, and thus, discretization and sampling through the inverse cumulative function are possible.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
We present two applications that depict diffusion of private data over a network. These examples show that bits of private information can be spread over the whole network, which allows users to estimate global quantities, such as epidemic spreading, while providing strong privacy guarantees.
A. Synthetic Data
We consider the synthetic network in Fig. 5 with N = |V| = 150 nodes and |E| = 1256 edges, where edges are formed based on proximity. Each user i ∈ {1, . . . , N} wishes to publish her vector-valued private data u i ∈ R 2 , such as her GPS coordinates. For simplicity, we focus on a single user; our technique can be applied independently for each user. The distance d ij between users i and j is captured by the shortest path length. We choose an exponential function (·) that converts distances d ij ∈ {1, . . . , 9} to privacy levels (d ij ) ∈ [. 5, 15] . The function (·) that converts distances d ij to privacy levels (d ij ) can be different for each agent. In fact, user i may require any privacy level against user j. In practice, these privacy levels can be manually chosen by each user or automatically generated by the system operator based on the structure of the network and preferences of the nodes. In any case, all privacy levels ij = (d ij ) are assumed public knowledge. Algorithm 1 is executed by user i for n = 2 and the norms of several traces are shown in Fig. 4 . For tight values of privacy level ( → 0), large amounts of noises are added. In Fig. 5, nodes are colored based on the accuracy y ij − u i 2 of the response y ij they receive.
Although we have assumed the existence of a secure communication channel between any two users of the network and the existence of a central authority which computes the distances d ij , an implementation that relaxes these assumptions is possible. Specifically, assuming only local communications between neighboring users, an honest-but-curious model, and knowledge of the privacy levels-which can be performed also in a decentralized manner-a distributed approach is possible. In such an implementation, user i sends to all her neighbors the signal {u i + V } ∈(0, (1)) . Then, each user j receives the sig-
, and broadcasts it to her friends. An application of this variation is left for future work.
B. Real Dataset: Facebook
In this section, we present an application of diffusing sensitive data on a real network. Specifically, an "ego network" [21] is a subgraph G = (V ∪ {Alice}, E) of Facebook induced by a single user, Alice, and her friends V. Fig. 7 plots such an ego network, where the bottom-left node is the user whose neighborhood is captured. The rest of the nodes represent Alice's friends, edges represent friendships between her friends, whereas the edges between Alice and her friends are omitted for clarity. We assume that Alice's infection status is captured by a single bit u ∈ {0, 1}. Then, Alice wishes to share this information with her friends in a privacy-preserving way.
For each friend i ∈ V, the distance d i is calculated by a central authority. Values {d i } i∈V are independent of the private data u and can be computed without any privacy requirements. The strength of the friendship between Alice and friend i is quantified by the value of d i and can be computed using methods from the social network literature such as the score functions suggested in [17] . Here, distances d i are evaluated according to
where Γ ∈ R n ×n is the pseudoinverse of the Laplace matrix L of the network. Due to space limitations, we use the fact that our technique allows postprocessing of the responses y ij and, thus, is applicable for private bits.
Initially, Alice executes Algorithm 1 in order to generate a single sample {w : ∈ [ ,¯ ]} of the stochastic process {V : > 0}, where (respectively,¯ ) is a lower (respectively, upper) bound of the quantity min i∈V (d i ) (respectively, max i∈V (d i )). Function (·) : R + → R + is a decreasing function, which converts distances d i to privacy levels i = (d i ). In this example, we chose (d) = exp(−3.3d + 4), which leads to privacy levels within [.5, 15] . In practice, any decreasing function resulting in any range of privacy levels can be used. The exact expression is considered a designer's choice that balances the users' privacy needs and the accuracy of network-wide statistics. Next, individual responses are generated during runtime. Whenever user i requests access to the sensitive data u, the response y i is securely communicated to user i:
where Π S is the projection operator on the set S. Fig. 6 depicts two executions of Algorithm 1 with n = 1, whereas Fig. 7 plots the ego network centered around Alice. In particular, Alice is shown on the bottom-left corner and each friend i is plotted at distance d i from her. The blue and red circles mark the jumps of the stochastic process for the two samples w blue and w red . Counterintuitively, friends i lying within two consecutive blue circles receive exactly the same response y i although they are assigned different privacy levels (d i ). The paradox is settled by noticing that the boundary circles are random variables themselves. Therefore, users receiving identical responses have different confidence levels.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considered the case of a network where each user owns a private data u ∈ R n such as her salary or her infection status and wishes to share approximations of this private data with the rest of the network under differential privacy guarantees. Specifically, we assumed that user i requires (d ij )-differential privacy against user j, where (·) is a decreasing function and d ij is the distance induced by the underlying network between users i and j. In this context, we derived a composite mechanism that generates the response y ij as user's j approximation of user's i private data. The accuracy of the response y ij depends only on the allocated privacy level (d ij ) and not on the size or other parameters of the network. An important property of our proposed mechanism is the resilience to coalitions, where we considered a group of users combining their received responses for more accurate approximations. Practically, this means that scenarios where an adversarial user creates multiple fake accounts cannot weaken the privacy guarantees. Algorithms for sampling from this composite mechanism were also provided. In particular, the complexity of these algorithms is independent of the size of the network, which renders them scalable, and is dictated only by the extreme privacy levels min i∈V (d ij ) and max i∈V (d ij ). Finally, we provided two illustrative examples: one on a synthetic network where users communicate their private GPS locations, and the other where a user shares her infection status with her Facebook ego network.
Concluding, reasons that users share their private data can be either for social interaction or for allowing crowdsourced statistics. In the first case, we view the proposed approach as a "soft-access scheme" to users' profiles, which substitutes the existing privacy settings in a social network. On the other hand, further work is required to address crowdsourced statistics. In that case, for accurate statistics, there is a tradeoff between the number of users residing far away and privacy level required against them.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 is established in multiple steps. First, we focus on the discrete-domain process
, where 1 ≤ · · · ≤ m and, in particular, on the case of m = 2, with
, where the second inequality is due to technical reasons. Next, we prove the Markov property, which allows m discrete privacy levels. Finally, we pass to the limit and derive the continuous-domain process {V } > 0 , as stated in Theorem 4.
Proof for two privacy levels: We consider the stochastic process V supported on two privacy levels { 1 , 2 }, where
Allowing generalized functions, we assume that the joint distribution of V 1 and V 2 has density
Density (3) should satisfy the following marginal distributions and privacy constraints:
where
. The first two constraints express that V 1 and V 2 should be Laplace distributed with parameters , respectively. The last constraint enforces that the mechanism that releases (u + V 1 , u + V 2 ) must be 2 -private, and thus, the mechanism's log density needs to be 2 -Lipschitz. We solve for densities g of the form
where φ : R n → R is a (possibly generalized) function satisfying
The first equation in (4) is an n-dimensional convolution with solution
where M(s; ) = F n e − x 2 (s), and s ∈ R n is the frequency. Solution (5) satisfies the second equation in (4) since
Finally, we need to prove that, for φ given in (5), density g is well defined, specifically
This is proven under the assumption that 2 < √ 2 1 ; this assumption will eventually be removed. According to Lemma 7, we get
The sum on the right-hand side is an infinite series only when n is even, and, for 2 < √ 2 1 , it converges uniformly in s to the left-hand side. Lemma 8 can be used to invert the series:
where r = x 2 , K k (x) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind, and * is the n-dimensional convolution. Since
− 1 ≥ 0 and K n 2 −1 (r) ≥ 0, density g is well defined. Next, we prove that the discrete-domain stochastic process
Proof of the Markov property: Consider the discretedomain process {V i } i∈{1,...,m } supported on m nondecreasing privacy levels { 1 , . . . , m }, and the joint distribution that satisfies the Markov property:
where l (v) ∝ e − v 2 is the n-dimensional Laplace distribution with parameter −1 and l 1 , 2 (v 1 , v 2 ) is the density g from the previous proof. Then, the joint distribution l 1 :m satisfies the following properties. 1) Accuracy: Each coordinate V i is optimally distributed, that is, Laplace distributed with parameter
, where y i = u + V i , is m -private. Indeed, the mechanism can be expressed as
. . .
Density l i −1 , i defined in (6) can be rewritten in the form
i+1 (v i+1 ) depends only on the quantity v i − v i + 1 . Therefore, V m is independent of the differences V i − V i + 1 . Thus, the mechanism can be viewed as the composition of the mprivate mechanism that releases u + V m postprocessed by adding independent noise. Since differential privacy is resilient to postprocessing [1] , the overall mechanism is m -private. Finally, we derive the continuous-domain process {V } > 0 by passing to the limit as the m → ∞, 1 = 0, and → ∞. Specifically, we derive closed-form expressions that lead to efficient algorithms for sampling of the continuous-domain stochastic process.
Proof of the continuous-domain process: In density (6), let 1 = and 2 = (1 + τ ) , where 0 < τ 1. Then, we prove that we can safely ignore high-order terms: , and define the random variable Z as follows:
where the random variables {V ( i ) } K i=0 form a discrete-domain stochastic process introduced in (7) . For large K, the step τ = q − 1 becomes arbitrarily small, and thus, we use the first-order approximation in (8) for each telescoping term (V ( i −1 ) − V ( i ) ) ∼ φ ( i ) . Finally, the random variable Z is distributed as
where we let τ → 0. This proves that we can approximate the continuous-domain stochastic process by a first-order approximation of the discrete-domain process. Equation (7) characterizes the stochastic process {V } > 0 . The atom renders the stochastic process lazy; with high probability, the process is constant over sufficiently small intervals. The linear term governs the statistics of the jump.
B. Proof of Proposition 5
We now provide the proof of Proposition 5 that characterizes the jumps of the stochastic process {V } > 0 and, thus, captures the complexity of Algorithm 1.
Proof: Consider the first-order approximation of the backwards conditional distribution φ derived in (8), where 0 < and 0 < δ 1: P (V = x|V (1+δ ) = y) ≈ (1 + (n + 1)τ ) −1 δ(x) + n (n + 1)
Let a n (x) denote the probability that the process performs n jumps in the interval [ , e x ] . Equation (9) shows that, for sufficiently small intervals [ , (1 + τ ) ], the process remains constant with probability (1 + (n + 1)τ ) −1 ; therefore, a n (x) is invariant of . Under the discretization introduced earlier, where ← and ← e x :
a 0 (x) = P (0 jumps in [ , e x ]) = e −(n +1)x .
A limiting argument is used to compute a 1 (x): 
Therefore, for a bounded interval [ , ] , the number n of jumps is characterized by distribution (10), which is the Poisson distribution with mean value (n + 1) ln .
C. Fourier Transform Pairs
In this section, we derive two Fourier pairs used in the proof of Theorem 4. By convention, the following definition of Fourier transform f where s ∈ R n .
Lemma 8:
The n-dimensional Fourier transform F of f :
